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Abstract   
The possibility of resale after an auction attracts speculators (i.e., bidders who have no use value for the objects 
on sale). In a multi-object auction, a high-value bidder may strictly prefer to let a speculator win some of the 
objects and then buy in the resale market, in order to keep the auction price low for the object she wins in the 
auction. Therefore, although speculators increase competition in the auction, they also affect high-value bidders’ 
incentives to “reduce demand.” We show that the net effect on the seller’s revenue of allowing resale to attract 
speculators depends on the heterogeneity of bidders’ valuations. But the presence of speculators may increase 
the seller’s revenue only if speculators are eventually outbid. We also analyze the effect on the seller’s revenue 
of allowing resale in the absence of speculators, and we discuss the strategies that the seller can adopt to increase 
his revenue. 
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When resale after an auction is allowed, speculators – i.e., players who have no use value for
the object on sale – may participate in the hope of winning the auction and then reselling to a
bidder who has a high use value for the object on sale.1 However, it is not clear why a bidder who
has a high use value should let a speculator win the auction, only then to buy from him in the
resale market. Indeed, in a single-object auction with complete information, a bidder is exactly
indiﬀerent between buying in the resale market and winning the auction (at the same price at
which he can buy in the resale market).2 And if there is an arbitrarily small cost to trade in
the resale market or if players discount by even an arbitrarily small amount the future surplus
from resale, then the bidder strictly prefers to outbid the speculator and win the auction.3
This paper analyzes the role of speculators in multi-object auctions and the eﬀects of the
possibility of resale and the presence of speculators on the seller’s revenue. We show that, in
contrast to single-object auctions, in multi-object auctions bidders with positive use values may
strictly prefer to let a speculator win some of the objects on sale and then purchase from the
speculator in the resale market. The reason is that letting the speculator win allows bidders to
keep the auction price low, and hence pay a lower price for those objects that they acquire in
the auction.4 So it can be common knowledge that speculators will win an auction, even when
competing against bidders with higher use values ,a n de v e nw i t h( n o tt o ol a r g e )r e s a l ec o s t sa n d
discounting.
Of course, speculators will win the auction when bidders with positive use values are not
allowed to participate in the auction and can only acquire the objects in the resale market
1A speculator can also be deﬁned as a player who has a positive but low use value, and only participates in
the auction to resell to a player with a higher use value (because, for example, his own use value is lower than
the opportunity cost of participating in the auction).
2Consider, for example, an ascending auction with one bidder who has value v for the object on sale and one
speculator who has value 0. If the speculator wins the auction and players equally share the gains from trade in
the resale market, the speculator resells to the bidder at price
1
2v. Therefore, the speculator is willing to bid up
to
1
2v in the auction. Similarly, the bidder is also willing to bid up to
1
2v, because this is the price at which she
can buy in the resale market. So there are multiple equilibria but the bidder has no compelling reason to let the
speculator win the auction. (And if the bidder bids up to her willingness to pay, the speculator should expect to
obtain no surplus and has no reason to participate in the auction in the ﬁrst place.)
3However, Garratt and Tröger (2006) show that, if a bidder is privately informed about her use value, in
second-price auctions there are also equilibria in undominated strategies in which a speculator wins by bidding a
very high price (that he expects not to pay) and inducing the bidder to bid zero. But these equilibria rely upon
the speculator bidding a price higher than the maximum price he would be happy to pay, even after taking into
account the surplus he can obtain in the resale market. Pagnozzi (2007) shows that a high-value bidder may
prefer to let a low-value bidder win the auction and then buy in the resale market if the auction price aﬀects
bargaining in the resale market because of wealth eﬀects. Resale can also take place if the order of bidders’
valuations change after the auction (Haile, 2000, 2003), if additional buyers appear after the auction (Milgrom,
1987), and in ﬁrst-price auctions with asymmetric bidders (Gupta and Lebrun, 1999; Hafalir and Krishna, 2006).
4In our analysis, we explicitly consider uniform-price auctions, but our results apply to any multi-object auction
in which players face a trade-oﬀ between winning more units and paying lower prices.
2(Bikhchandani and Huang, 1989; Bose and Deltas, 2002).5 But we show that speculators may
win even if all bidders with positive use values can and do participate in the auction.
As an example, consider the UK 3.4GHz simultaneous ascending auction for 15 licenses to
oﬀer broadband wireless services in UK regions. Paciﬁc Century Cyberworks (PCCW), a Hong-
Kong telecom company, was widely considered the highest-value bidder and was expected to
win all 15 licenses. Red Spectrum and Public Hub were two small companies created explicitly
to participate in the auction. It was not clear they had a genuine interest in providing wireless
services and, at the beginning of the auction, they chose to be eligible to bid for only one license
each. As soon as PCCW, Red Spectrum and Public Hub were the only three bidders left in the
auction, PCCW reduced its demand to 13 licenses, thus allowing Red Spectrum and Public Hub
to win one license each and preventing the auction price from rising any further. The auction
ended in June 2003. By March 2004, PCCW obtained the two licenses it had not won in the
auction by taking over Red Spectrum and Public Hub.6
But what is the eﬀect of the presence of speculators on the seller’s revenue? It is often
argued that speculators always increase the seller’s revenue, because the eﬀect of their presence
is to increase the number of bidders, and hence to increase competition in the auction. So, it is
argued, the seller should always allow resale after the auction and welcome speculators.
However, as our previous example suggests, attracting speculators also aﬀects bidders’ strate-
gies in the auction. On the one hand, speculators can induce bidders with positive use values to
bid more aggressively in order to beat speculators and win the auction. On the other hand, in
multi-object auctions the possibility of resale also aﬀects bidders’ incentive to “reduce demand”
– i.e., to bid for fewer objects than they actually want, in order to pay a lower price for the
objects they win – which typically reduces the seller’s revenue (Wilson, 1979).7 Firstly, because
5Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) and Bose and Deltas (2002) analyze the role of speculators as intermediaries
in auctions in which the ﬁnal consumers are not allowed to participate, as with treasury bill auctions and large
real-estate auctions.
6Since explicit resale of a license was not allowed, PCCW had to take over the original winners to ob-
tain their licenses. Red Spectrum was actually taken over only 3 months after the end of the auction.
For more details, see “3.4GHz Broadband Ready for Action” by Graeme Wearden, ZDNet UK, available at
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/communications/wireless/0,39020348,39149852,00.htm.
T h ef a i l u r eb yP C C Wt ow i na l l1 5l i c e n s e sw a sd e s c r i b e da sa“ s u r p r i s e , ”a“ g a ﬀe,” and “a
costly mistake [that] may have cost [PCCW] the chance of oﬀering a nationwide service” (see “UK
Operators Miss Out in Wireless Broadband Auction” by Graeme Wearden, ZDNet UK, available at
http : //news.zdnet.co.uk/communications/0,39020336,2136110,00.htm). Given the subsequent events, it ap-
pears that PCCW’s strategy was not a mistake after all.
7The literature on demand reduction also includes Ausubel and Cramton (1998), Back and Zender (1993),
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998a), Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Kremer and Nyborg (2004), and Noussair
(1995). Kagel and Levin (2001) and List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) provide experimental evidence of demand
reduction; Weber (1997), Wolfram (1998), and Wolak (2003) argue that demand reduction aﬀected several FCC
spectrum auctions, as well as the UK and the California electricity markets; Cassady (1967) reports of “collusive”
demand reduction in many auctions of divisible commodities, such as ﬁsh in England, timber in the US and wool
in Australia. See also Klemperer (2004). Milgrom (2004) provides an excellent exposition of the literature on
multi-object auctions.
3resale can correct an ineﬃcient allocation, it makes demand reduction much less costly for the
higher-value bidders (who have the strongest incentive not to reduce demand without resale).
The reason is that, even if they lose some of the objects on sale to a speculator in the auction,
higher-value bidders still have a chance to buy those objects in the resale market. Secondly,
resale makes it more costly for a bidder to outbid lower-value competitors, because these com-
petitors bid more aggressively in the auction if they can resell the objects they acquire. These
two eﬀects make demand reduction more proﬁtable for bidders. Thirdly, in contrast to the pre-
vious two eﬀects, by attracting speculators, resale may make demand reduction less proﬁtable
for some bidders with positive use values, because they may have to share the objects on sale
with speculators if they reduce demand to keep the auction price low.
So speculators do indeed increase competition in the auction. But to attract speculators,
the seller has to allow resale, and this may induce an accommodating strategy by bidders with
positive use values and thus reduce the seller’s revenue.8
The net eﬀect on the seller’s revenue of allowing resale and attracting speculators depends on
the bidders’ relative valuations: (i) if bidders’ valuations are relatively similar (i.e., clustered),
speculators increase the seller’s revenue; (ii) if bidders’ valuations are suﬃciently diﬀerent (i.e.,
dispersed), speculators reduce the seller’s revenue. The reason is that, if bidders’ valuations
are similar, after winning an object in the auction, bidders with lower valuations have a much
higher outside option (relatively to the highest valuation) than speculators in the resale market,
and hence they obtain a much higher proﬁt than speculators from winning the auction and
reselling. Therefore, in this case, the presence of speculators induces lower-value bidders to bid
more aggressively and has a strong competitive eﬀect. By contrast, if bidders’ valuations are
far from each other, the main eﬀect of allowing resale and attracting speculators is to induce
all bidders with positive use values to reduce demand, because in this case it is too costly for
lower-value bidders to outbid speculators.
In order to increase his revenue, the seller should design an auction to induce bidders to
compete aggressively and not reduce demand. So the seller should allow resale to attract spec-
ulators if he knows bidders are relatively symmetric. However, provided he can credibly do so,
the seller should forbid resale to increase his revenue if he knows bidders are asymmetric, even
though this excludes speculators and reduces the number of competitors in the auction. In fact,
attracting speculators by allowing resale when bidders are asymmetric only induces high-value
bidders to reduce demand.9
8For an analysis of the eﬀects of resale on the seller’s revenue in single-object auctions with a ﬁxed number of
players see Garratt and Tröger (2006) and Pagnozzi (2007). Hafalir and Krishna (2006) show that, with resale
and asymmetric bidders, a ﬁrst-price auction yields a higher seller’s revenue than a second-price auction. Ausubel
and Cramton (1999), Calzolari and Pavan (2006), and Zheng (2002) analyze optimal selling mechanisms when
resale is allowed.
9Bose and Deltas (2002) prove that, when speculators can resell to additional bidders who do not participate
4Our analysis also shows that the presence of speculators can increase the seller’s revenue
only if they are eventually outbid by bidders with positive use values. Otherwise, if bidders
accommodate speculators and allow them to win by reducing demand, the seller’s revenue is
(weakly) reduced. So observing speculators win the auction is bad news for the seller, because
it shows that bidders with high use values have chosen to allow speculators to win in order to
obtain a higher proﬁt in the auction.
However, if the seller cannot prevent resale, the presence of speculators always weakly in-
creases the seller’s revenue.10 This is because, if resale is possible, even when no speculator par-
ticipates in the auction, low-value bidders can themselves resell to high-value bidders. Therefore,
high-value bidders have a strong incentive to reduce demand and buy in the resale market even
without speculators. In this case, the only eﬀect of the presence of speculators is to increase
competition in the auction.
Finally, when there is no speculator who may participate in the auction, allowing resale has
only two contrasting eﬀects on the seller’s revenue. On the one hand, it increases the price that
lower-value bidders – those who resell in the aftermarket – are willing to pay in the auction. On
the other hand, allowing resale unambiguously facilitates demand reduction, because it makes
it more costly for all bidders to deviate from demand reduction and less costly for higher-value
bidders to reduce demand. (And, without speculators, allowing resale has no countervailing
eﬀect on the number of competitors in the auction.) When this second eﬀect prevails, allowing
resale reduces the seller’s revenue.
A compelling reason to allow winners to resell after an auction is that resale favours an eﬃ-
cient ﬁnal allocation of the objects on sale. But our analysis suggests that a revenue-maximizing
seller may want to commit to prevent resale in order to increase the auction price, even if this
may reduce eﬃciency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3
deﬁnes the types of equilibria of the auction. Section 4 analyzes bidding strategies and shows that
speculators may win an auction against high-value bidders. The eﬀects of resale and speculators
on the seller’s revenue and the strategies that the seller can adopt to increase his revenue are
analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 analyzes how resale aﬀects the seller’s revenue when there is no
speculator, and the last section concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
in the auction anyway, the seller may want to exclude bidders, rather than speculators, from the auction.
10In the UK 3.4 GHz auction bidders could, in practice, resell the licenses won and, arguably, the seller’s revenue
would have been even lower without the participation of Red Spectrum and Public Hub.
52. The Model
Consider a (sealed-bid) uniform-price auction for k units of the same good. Each player who
participates in the auction submits k non-negative bids, one for each unit. The k highest bids are
awarded the units, and the winner(s) pay for each unit won a price equal to the (k +1 )
th-highest
bid.11 The reserve price is normalized to zero.12
We analyze a uniform-price auction for simplicity, because this is the auction mechanism
in which the incentive to reduce demand arises more clearly (Ausubel and Cramton, 1998).
But many of our qualitative results also hold for simultaneous ascending auctions (in which
bidding remains open on all units on sale until no one wants to bid any more on any unit), for
discriminatory-price auctions (in which winners pay the price they bid for each unit they are
awarded),13 and indeed for any mechanism to allocate multiple units in which players face a
trade-oﬀ between winning more units and paying lower prices.
Players
There are n (female) bidders, called B1,...,B n, who have positive use values for the units on sale.
To make the model interesting, we assume that n<k . If the number of bidders is greater than
or equal to the number of units on sale, competition among bidders crowds out speculators, who
hence have no chance of winning the auction (as in a single-unit auction).14 We let vi be the use
value of bidder Bi for each of the units on sale – i.e., we assume bidders have ﬂat demand.15
Without loss of generality, we assume that v1 >v 2 >. . .>v n.
There are also (k − n) identical (male) speculators who have no use value for the units on
sale.16 The speculators participate in the auction if the seller allows them to do so and if resale
11Uniform-price auctions are often used to allocate multiple identical objects. For example, uniform-price
auctions are used for on-line IPOs (including the one of Google in August 2004), electricity markets, markets for
emission permits, and by the US Treasury Department to issue new securities.
12Footnote 27 and Section 5.3 discuss the eﬀects of increasing the reserve price in our model.
13In a discriminatory-price auction, a bidder always bids less than her valuation in order to make a proﬁt.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998b) show that, because the incentive to shade one’s bid is stronger for the
ﬁrst units, also a discriminatory-price auction may be ineﬃcient. See also Ausubel and Cramton (1998).
14As it will be clear from the analysis, if n ≥ k the auction price is at least equal to the highest price the
lowest-valued bidder is willing to pay. At this price, speculators cannot possibly make a positive proﬁt.
15Assuming ﬂat demand simpliﬁes the analysis because, as we are going to show, it implies that, when players
bid in the auction, they know whether they will buy or sell in the resale market, and they know the price at which
they will trade. When bidders have non-ﬂat demand (i.e., use values for additional units are decreasing or there
are complementarities), how bidders will trade in the resale market and the price at which they will trade depend
on the identity of the auction winners, the number of units each of them wins, and the details of the bargaining
process. This would complicate the analysis, but would yield qualitative results similar to the ones we obtain.
16It is possible to make the number of speculators endogenous by assuming that a speculator enters the auction
if and only if he expects to make positive proﬁt. In particular, suppose speculators arrive at the auction one
after the other and observe only the number of bidders and the number of speculators who have entered. At this
point, a speculator can pay an arbitrarily small cost and enter the auction, or walk away and obtain zero proﬁt.
If he enters, the speculator learns bidders’ use values. Bidding is costless, so a speculator who enters the auction
always bids.
6after the auction is allowed.17 We generically refer to a “player” when we want to indicate either
a bidder or a speculator. Speciﬁcally, player S indicates a speculator and player i indicates bidder
Bi, i =1 ,...,n.
We make the following assumption on valuations, which is standard in the literature on
demand reduction (e.g., Wilson, 1979).
Assumption 1. Use values are common knowledge among bidders and speculators, but the
seller does not know bidders’ use values.
This assumption implies that players know the ex-post eﬃcient allocation of the units on sale
before the auction. Therefore, in our model resale is not caused by uncertainty in valuations, or
by a change in the order of bidders’ valuations after the auction (as in Haile, 2000, 2003).
In Section 5.3, in order to investigate the strategies that the seller can adopt to increase
his revenue, we analyze how the seller’s behavior depends on whether he knows if bidders’
valuations are relatively similar to each other or diﬀerent from each other,18 a n do nw h e t h e r
he can prevent resale or not. We also analyze whether the seller can beneﬁtf r o mb e i n ga b l e
to distinguish bidders from speculators and to prevent the participation of speculators in the
auction.
Resale Market
When resale is allowed, players always trade in the resale market if there are gains from trade
obtainable. For simplicity, we assume that a unit can be traded only once in the resale market
and that, if two players start bargaining on the terms of trade, they cannot then trade with
any other player. (In other words, we assume that two players have to commit to trade with
each other before bargaining on the terms of trade.) So when players bargain to trade a unit
in the resale market, the outside option of the player who has won the unit in the auction is
equal to his use value, while the outside option of the player who is trying to acquire the unit is
It follows that a speculator enters the auction if and only if he has some positive probability of winning (before
knowing bidders’ use values). From the analysis, it will become clear that, if the number of speculators who have
entered the auction is greater than (k − n), no speculator can possibly obtain positive proﬁt (see footnote 30).
So once the number of speculators is equal to (k − n), no other speculator pays the entry cost. While if there are
no more than (k − n) speculators, speculators win the auction and obtain positive proﬁt for some bidders’ use
values (Proposition 1). Therefore, exactly (k − n) speculators pay the entry cost and participate in the auction.
17For our analysis, the relevant diﬀerence between speculators and low-value bidders is that speculators can
only obtain a positive proﬁt by reselling, while low-value bidders can also obtain a positive proﬁt by keeping a
unit, even if they prefer to resell to a high-value bidder. Therefore, low-value bidders participate in the auction
even if resale is not allowed, but speculators do not. See also footnote 33.
18Even if the seller does not know the exact bidders’ valuations, he may have an estimate of bidders’ relative
valuations. For example, the seller may know whether the valuation of the highest bidder is more or less than
k times the valuation of the second-highest bidder, even if he does not know the exact valuation of any of these
bidders.
7normalized to zero.19 It follows that the gains from trade between two players are equal to the
diﬀerence between their use values and, if any player apart from bidder B1 wins a unit in the
auction, to maximize the gains from trade he always resells to bidder B1, the player with the
highest use value.
We make the following assumption on the sharing of the gains from trade.
Assumption 2. When two players trade a unit in the resale market, they equally share the
gains from trade.
Therefore, the outcome of bargaining between two players in the resale market is given by
the Nash bargaining solution, where the disagreement point is represented by players’ outside
options.20 And the resale price at which two players trade is “half way” between the two players’
use values.
This assumption is made for simplicity, but all our qualitative results hold for any given
sharing of the gains from trade in the resale market (in which the auction winner obtains some
of the surplus). Indeed, the highest-value bidder may strictly prefer to reduce demand and allow
other players to win the auction even if the auction winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer in the
resale market, and hence obtains all gains from trade. This is because, even if the highest-value
bidder can obtain no surplus in the resale market, reducing demand still allows her to pay a
lower price for the units she wins in the auction.21
“Willingness to Pay”
When resale is allowed, a player’s “willingness to pay” for a unit in the auction – which we
deﬁne as the highest auction price that a player is happy to pay for a unit – is represented by
the price at which he can buy or sell a unit in the resale market (e.g., Milgrom, 1987).
If a speculator wins a unit in the auction, he resells to bidder B1 at price 1
2v1; and if bidder
Bi, i 6=1 , wins a unit in the auction, he resells to bidder B1 at price 1
2 (v1 + vi). Therefore,
during the auction, the highest price a speculator is happy to pay for one unit is 1
2v1 –i . e . ,t h e
19We choose to model the bargaining procedure in the resale market in the simplest possible way. But our
results are robust to many alternative assumptions about bargaining. For example, we can assume that, while
bargaining with one bidder in the resale market, the auction winner can still threaten to trade with a diﬀerent
bidder. In this case, the outside option of the auction winner is higher than his use value and he obtains a larger
share of the gains from trade in the resale market. So players are willing to pay a higher price to win a unit in
the auction. This alternative assumption changes the speciﬁc equilibrium conditions we derive in Sections 4 and
5, but not their qualitative interpretation, and it actually reinforces our results on the eﬀects of allowing resale
and attracting speculators on bidders’ incentive to reduce demand and on the seller’s revenue (because it makes
demand reduction even more attractive for bidders when resale is allowed).
20This can be interpreted as the limit, as the length of the bargaining periods goes to zero, of a strategic model
of alternating oﬀers where players face a small exogenous risk of breakdown of negotiations, that induces them to
take their outside options (Binmore et al., 1986; Sutton, 1986).
21And giving diﬀerent bargaining powers to diﬀerent players (e.g., by assuming that speculators can obtain a
smaller share of the gains from trade than low-value bidders when trading with bidder B1, or vice versa) also
does not aﬀect any of our qualitative results.
8resale price he can obtain in the aftermarket – and the highest price bidder Bi, i 6=1 ,i sh a p p y
to pay for one unit is 1
2 (v1 + vi) – i.e., the resale price she can obtain in the aftermarket. And
since bidder B1 can buy a unit in the resale market at a price no higher than 1
2 (v1 + v2),t h i si s
the highest price she is happy to pay in the auction.
Hence, taking into account the resale market, bidder B1 is willing to pay a lower price in
the auction because of the possibility of purchasing the units she loses from the auction winners
in the aftermarket, while all other bidders and speculators are willing to pay a higher price in
the auction because of the possibility of reselling in the aftermarket to bidder B1.22 (But notice
that a player’s bid in the auction does not aﬀect the outcome of the resale market.)
When resale does not take place, the proﬁt of a player who wins the auction is given by the
diﬀerence between the use value of the unit(s) he acquires and the auction price he pays. When
resale takes place, the proﬁt of a player who wins the auction and resells the unit(s) is given by
the diﬀerence between the price he receives in the resale market and the auction price he pays;
while the proﬁt of a player who buys in the resale market is given by the diﬀerence between the
use value of the unit(s) he acquires and the price he pays in the resale market. The proﬁto fa
player who loses the auction is normalized to zero.
Bidding Strategies















i (i.e., a player’s
demand must be non-increasing in price). There is demand reduction if a player’s bid is lower
than the highest price he is happy to pay for a unit. We assume players do not play weakly
dominated strategies. As we will show, this implies that b
j
i cannot be higher than the highest
price player i is happy to pay for the jth unit, and that players do not reduce demand for the
ﬁrst unit.
We say that an equilibrium is Pareto dominated by another equilibrium from the players’
point of view if in the second equilibrium at least one player is strictly better oﬀ and no player is
worse oﬀ than in the ﬁrst equilibrium. We make the following assumption on players’ equilibrium
strategies.
Assumption 3. Players do not play an equilibrium that is Pareto dominated, from the players’
point of view, by another equilibrium.
22In the terminology of Haile (2003), bidder B1 i sw i l l i n gt op a yal o w e rp r i c ei nt h ea u c t i o nb e c a u s eo ft h e
“resale buyer eﬀect” and the other players are willing to pay a higher price in the auction because of the “resale
seller eﬀect.”
9This assumption allows us to select among multiple equilibria. (In our game, Assumption 3 is
consistent with the “coalition proofness” concept of Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987.)
We also make the following assumption to simplify the analysis.
Assumption 4. If two players submit the same bid for a unit, the unit is assigned to the player
with the highest use value.
This assumption allows us to simplify the description of equilibrium strategies but our results
do not hinge on it.
3. Deﬁnition of Equilibria
It is well known that, in a uniform-price auction, it is a weakly dominant strategy for a player to
bid his willingness to pay for the ﬁrst unit (see, e.g., Milgrom, 2004).23 Moreover, bidding more
than your willingness to pay for any unit is also a weakly dominated strategy.24 But players
may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to reduce demand and bid less than their willingness to pay for some units
other than the ﬁrst one, in order to pay a lower price for the units they win and so obtain a
higher proﬁt (Wilson, 1979; Ausubel and Cramton, 1998). The logic is the same as the standard
textbook logic for a monopsonist withholding demand: buying an additional unit increases the
price paid for the ﬁrst, inframarginal, units.
We consider two types of equilibria (in undominated strategies) of the auction. In one type
of equilibria, which we call Demand Reduction equilibria, speculators win if they participate; in
the other type of equilibria, which we call Positive Price equilibria, all speculators and possibly
also some of the bidders lose. Notice that, in order for speculators to win the auction, it is
necessary that bidders reduce demand, because bidders have higher willingness to pay for all
units than speculators and speculators do not bid more than their willingness to pay.
Deﬁnition 1. A (zero-price) Demand Reduction (DR) equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the
auction in which each player who participates in the auction wins at least one of the units on
sale and the auction price is zero.
Of course, there can be other equilibria in which each player wins at least one of the units
on sale but the auction price is strictly positive. However, any such equilibrium with a positive
auction price is Pareto dominated for players by the zero-price DR equilibrium in which each
23Ap l a y e r ’ sﬁrst-unit bid aﬀects the auction price only when it is the (k +1 )
th-highest bid, in which case the
player wins no unit and the price is irrelevant to him. Therefore, exactly as in a single-unit second-price auction,
the ﬁrst-unit bid is chosen to allow the player to win whenever it is proﬁt a b l ef o rh i mt od os o–i . e . ,w h e nh i s
willingness to pay is no lower than the auction price.
24Excluding weakly dominated strategies allows us to exclude, in our model, demand reduction equilibria in
which a speculator bids for the ﬁrst unit a price that he does not want to pay (and that even a bidder does not
want to pay), expecting not to pay for it (see Levin, 2005).
10player wins exactly the same number of units as in the ﬁrst equilibrium (because the ﬁnal
allocation is the same in both equilibria but the auction price that players pay is lower in the
zero-price DR equilibrium). And whenever the auction has an equilibrium in which each player
wins at least one unit and the auction price is positive, it also has a zero-price DR equilibrium.25
So it is natural to expect that players will never choose an equilibrium in which they all win but
the auction price is positive (and Assumption 3 excludes these equilibria).26
Deﬁnition 2. A Positive Price (PP) equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the auction in which
the auction price is strictly positive and: (i) if speculators participate in the auction, no specu-
lator wins any unit; (ii) if speculators do not participate in the auction, at least one bidder does
not win any unit.
Although in a PP equilibrium some players do not win any unit and the auction price is
diﬀerent from zero, bidders do not necessarily bid the highest price they are willing to pay for
all units – i.e., there may still be demand reduction. There are many possible types of PP
equilibria in which speculators lose when they participate in the auction. For example, bidders
may outbid speculators and share the units on sale (and there are many diﬀerent ways in which
they can share the units on sale), so that each bidder wins at least one unit. Or some higher-
value bidders may outbid all other players (including lower-value bidders) and win all units.
Similarly, when speculators do not participate in the auction, there are many possible types of
PP equilibria in which some of the bidders lose.
We choose to distinguish only between Demand Reduction and Positive Price equilibria
because we are interested in analyzing under which conditions bidders may reduce demand and
allow speculators to win. This is also the only case in which the auction price can be zero when
speculators participate in the auction and, as it will become clear from the analysis, in this case
the possibility of resale and the presence of speculators can reduce the seller’s revenue.
4. Successful Speculators
When resale is allowed and speculators participate in the auction, in a zero-price DR equilibrium
each player bids the highest price he is happy to pay for one unit and zero for all other units.
Precisely, bidder B1 bids:
b1 =( 1
2 (v1 + v2); 0;...;0 | {z }
k−1
),
25However, as we will show, the converse is not true – i.e., for some bidders’ use values, a zero-price DR
equilibrium is the only equilibrium in which each player wins at least one unit.




2 (v1 + vi); 0;...;0 | {z }
k−1
),i =2 ,...,n,
and each speculator bids:
bS =( 1
2v1;0 ; ...;0 | {z }
k−1
).
So each player wins exactly one unit and the seller’s revenue is zero. All bidders, apart from
B1, and all speculators resell the units they buy in the auction to bidder B1 in the aftermarket.
We investigate under which condition there is a DR equilibrium in which speculators win
the auction.27 Deﬁne the following (n − 1) conditions “Dispersed Top Values” (DTV):
½
v1 +( k +2− i)vi > (k +1− i)v2,i =3 ,...,n,
v1 > (k − n)v2.
(DTV)
Lemma 1. When resale is allowed and speculators participate, the auction has a (zero-price)
DR equilibrium if and only if conditions DTV are satisﬁed. Moreover, if conditions DTV are
satisﬁed, the (zero-price) DR equilibrium is the unique Pareto dominant equilibrium for players.
If instead one or more of conditions DTV is not satisﬁed, the auction only has PP equilibria.
As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, if conditions DTV are satisﬁed, no players wants to
deviate from a DR equilibrium. In other words, when his competitors reduce demand to one
unit, each player prefers to win a single unit in the auction at price zero, rather than try to
obtain more units by outbidding his competitors. (And deviating by winning less than one unit
is clearly not proﬁtable.) We now provide intuition for why this is the case.
Bidder B1 and the speculators have no incentive to deviate from demand reduction. To see
this notice that, in order to win more than one unit, a speculator has at least to outbid another
speculator. But this would raise the auction price to at least 1
2v1, a price at which the speculator
can obtain no proﬁt. Similarly, if bidder B1 wins more than one unit in the auction, she only
increases the auction price that she pays for the ﬁrst unit (since after reducing demand to one
unit, she still buys all other units in the resale market, at the same prices she would have to pay
to win them in the auction).
Bidder B2 is the one who has the highest incentive to deviate from demand reduction, because
she gains the most from outbidding lower-value players and winning more units to resell in the
aftermarket. So if bidder B2 prefers not to deviate from demand reduction, all other lower-value
27If the auction has a positive reserve price, it is less proﬁtable for players to reduce demand, because they
have at least to pay the reserve price to win a unit. In this case, an equilibrium in which all players reduce
demand requires more restrictive conditions than the ones we derive for a (zero-price) DR equilibrium. However,
our qualitative results on the eﬀects of resale and speculators hold even with a positive reserve price.
12bidders also prefer not to deviate. And bidder B2 does not deviate from the DR equilibrium if
and only if conditions DTV hold.28
Conditions DTV require that the use values of the two highest-value bidders are suﬃciently
dissimilar. For example, all conditions DTV are satisﬁed if v1 > (k − 2)v2. The reason is that, if
bidder B1’s use value is suﬃciently higher than bidder B2’s use value, it is too costly for bidder
B2 to outbid lower-value bidders and/or speculators. Precisely, if v1 is high, lower-value bidders
and speculators can resell at a high price to bidder B1, and thus they bid a high price for at
least one unit in the auction. And if v2 is low, bidder B2 has a low outside option in the resale
market; hence, she can only resell at a relatively low price and she is not willing to pay a high
price in the auction.
When conditions DTV are satisﬁed, there may also be PP equilibria. However, as shown in
the proof of Lemma 1, when a bidder prefers not to deviate from a DR equilibrium, she also
obtains a higher proﬁt in the DR equilibrium than in any equilibrium with a positive auction
price. Therefore, when conditions DTV are satisﬁed, the zero-price DR equilibrium is the
Pareto-dominant equilibrium for players and, by Assumption 3, players select the zero-price DR
equilibrium. When one or more of conditions DTV is not satisﬁed, at least one bidder (bidder
B2) prefers to outbid speculators (by bidding at least 1
2v1 for (k − n +1 )units). So speculators
cannot win the auction and there are only PP equilibria with an auction price of at least 1
2v1.29
By Lemma 1, all bidders with positive use values may strictly prefer to let speculators win
some of the units on sale in equilibrium. So we have the following result.
Proposition 1. If and only if conditions DTV are satisﬁed, in equilibrium each speculator wins
one of the units on sale and resells to bidder B1 in the aftermarket.
Therefore, speculators may successfully participate in a multi-unit uniform-price auction, and
resell in the aftermarket to the highest-value bidder, thus obtaining a strictly positive proﬁt.30
But speculators are not always able to win. The reason is that the presence of speculators in
the auction has two eﬀects on bidders:
(i) Competition Eﬀect: speculators increase competition with low-value bidders;
(ii) Demand Reduction Eﬀect: resale and speculators aﬀect bidders’ incentive to reduce demand.
28For example, bidder B2 prefers to win one unit at price 0 rather than overbid bidder B3 (together with
lower-value bidders and speculators) and win (k − 1) units to resell to bidder B1 if and only if
1
2 (v1 + v2) >
(k − 1)
1
2 (v1 + v2) −
1
2 (v1 + v3)

⇔ (k − 1)v3 + v1 > (k − 2)v2. Similarly, bidder B2 prefers to win one
unit at price 0 rather than overbid speculators and win (k − n +1 ) units if and only if
1
2 (v1 + v2) >
(k − n +1 )
1




⇔ v1 > (k − n)v2.
29An analysis of the diﬀerent types of PP equilibria is contained in the working paper version of this article.
30Clearly, if more than (k − n) speculators participate in the auction, competition among speculators drives
their proﬁt to zero. This is because each speculator bids
1
2v1 f o ra tl e a s to n eu n i t( a n db i d d e r sb i de v e nh i g h e r
prices for at least one unit) and, therefore, the auction price is no lower than
1
2v1, which is the highest proﬁta
speculator can obtain by reselling a unit in the aftermarket.
13The demand reduction eﬀect always induces bidder B1 to bid less aggressively and accom-
modate speculators. The reason is that bidder B1 can always buy from speculators in the resale
market, and hence obtain the units she loses in the auction. Therefore, bidding aggressively in
the auction has the only eﬀect of increasing the auction price that bidder B1 pays for the units
she wins in the auction. Moreover, the demand reduction eﬀect may also induce other bidders
to bid less aggressively, in order to pay a lower price in the auction (even at the cost of winning
less units).31
On the other hand, the competition eﬀect may induce bidders diﬀerent from B1 to bid more
aggressively in order to beat speculators. The reason is that, during the auction, these bidders are
directly competing with speculators for a chance to resell to bidder B1 in the aftermarket. And
if these bidders lose a unit in the auction, they have no chance of buying it in the aftermarket.
Speculators win the auction if the demand reduction eﬀect is stronger than the competition
eﬀect.
In other words, even when resale is allowed, it is the possibility that bidders reduce demand
that really attracts speculators to the auction. But speculators win the auction only if bidders
actually prefer to reduce demand rather than outbid them.32
5. Seller’s Revenue
In this section, we analyze how the presence of speculators in an auction aﬀects the seller’s
revenue. Notice that the two eﬀects we have described of speculators on bidders may aﬀect
the seller’s revenue in opposite directions: the competition eﬀect tends to increase the seller’s
revenue, while the demand reduction eﬀect may reduce the seller’s revenue.
There are two diﬀerent reasons why speculators may not participate in an auction: (i) resale
is not allowed, and so speculators have no incentive to participate in the auction, (ii) the seller
prevents speculators from participating, even if resale is allowed and so speculators would like
to participate in the auction. Therefore, to analyze the eﬀect of the presence of speculators in
each of these cases, we consider the seller’s revenue in three diﬀerent scenarios:
(1) Resale is allowed and speculators are allowed to participate in the auction.
(2) Resale is not allowed and hence speculators do not participate in the auction.
(3) Resale is allowed but speculators are not allowed to participate in the auction.
The ﬁrst scenario (in which speculators participate in the auction) was analyzed in Section
31Bidders have an incentive to reduce demand even without speculators. But allowing resale and attracting
speculators in the auction can increase this incentive. See Section 5.
32The reason why in single-unit auctions it is unclear why speculators may win is that there is no scope for
proﬁtable demand reduction by a bidder with a positive use value: if the bidder loses the single unit on sale, she
obtains no proﬁt in the auction.
144. In the next two sections, we analyze the seller’s revenue in the other two scenarios (in which,
for diﬀerent reasons, speculators do not participate in the auction) and compare it with the
seller’s revenue in the ﬁrst scenario.
5.1. Should Resale Be Allowed to Attract Speculators?
Assume resale is not allowed, so that speculators do not participate in the auction. In this case,
we have a standard auction with a ﬁxed number of bidders,33 and the highest price a bidder is
happy to pay in the auction is equal to her use value.
Even without speculators, there may be a zero-price DR equilibrium in which bidder B1 bids
her valuation for (k − n +1 )units and zero for all other units – i.e.:
b1 =( v1;...; v1 | {z }
k−n+1
;0 ; ...;0 | {z }
n−1
),
and each other bidder bids her valuation for one unit and zero for all other units – i.e.:
bi =( vi;0 ; ...;0 | {z }
k−1
),i =2 ,...,n.
In this equilibrium, bidder B1 wins (k − n +1 )units, all other bidders win one unit each, and
the auction price is zero.
There are many other possible DR equilibria in which each bidder wins at least one unit and
the auction price is zero. For example, there may be DR equilibria in which a bidder wins any
number of units between 1 and (k − n +1 ) . We focus on the DR equilibrium in which bidder
B1 wins (k − n +1 )units because the conditions that have to be satisﬁed in order for this to
be an equilibrium are less restrictive than the conditions for any other DR equilibrium. The
reason is that bidder B1 has the strongest incentive to deviate from a DR equilibrium and, in the
equilibrium described, she wins the highest number of units consistent with each bidder winning
at least one unit.34
We investigate under which condition there is a DR equilibrium, and therefore the seller can
obtain no revenue from the auction. Deﬁne the following (2n − 3) conditions “Clustered Values”
(CV): ½
(k +2− i)vi > (n +1− i)v1,i =2 ,...,n,
(n +2− i)vi > (n +1− i)v2,i =3 ,...,n.
(CV)
33In contrast to speculators, low-value bidders have an incentive to participate in the auction even when resale
is not allowed, because they can win and obtain their use value if their higher-value competitors reduce demand.
And bidders participate even if there is a small entry cost that they have to pay to enter the auction and learn the
other bidders’ use values. The reason is that, ex-ante, all bidders have a positive probability of winning if their
opponents’ reduce demand, and hence they expect to earn positive proﬁt. (Once a bidder enters the auction, we
assume she always bids because bidding is costless.)
34So the conditions for this DR equilibrium are the “minimum” conditions that have to be satisﬁed for having
a DR equilibrium. More details can be found in the proof of Lemma 2.
15Lemma 2. When resale is not allowed, the auction has a (zero-price) DR equilibrium if and
only if conditions CV are satisﬁed. Moreover, if conditions CV are satisﬁed, the (zero-price)
DR equilibrium Pareto dominates, from the bidders’ point of view, any other equilibrium with
a positive auction price. If instead one or more of conditions CV is not satisﬁed, the auction
only has PP equilibria.
Each bidder may have an incentive to deviate from a DR equilibrium, because she may prefer
to outbid lower-value bidders and win more units. As shown in the proof of Lemma 2, the ﬁrst
(n − 1) conditions CV imply that bidder B1 does not want to deviate from the DR equilibrium
described (in which she wins (k − n +1 ) units at price 0), while the last (n − 2) conditions
CV imply that bidder B2 does not want the deviate from the DR equilibrium described.35 And
bidder B2 has an higher incentive to deviate from demand reduction than all lower-value bidders
(because she has a higher use value and hence obtains a higher proﬁt from winning more units).
So if it is not proﬁtable for bidder B2 to deviate from demand reduction, it is also not proﬁtable
to deviate for lower-value bidders. Summing up, if conditions CV are satisﬁed, each bidder
prefers to reduce demand and maintain the auction price at zero, rather than obtain more units
by outbidding her competitors.
Conditions CV require that the use values of the two highest-value bidders are not too
much higher than all other bidders’ use values. For example, conditions CV are all satisﬁed
if kvn > (n − 1)v1 and (n − 1)vn > (n − 2)v2.36 The intuition is that, if the two highest use
values are suﬃciently close to the other lower use values, lower-value bidders can resell at a
relatively high price in the aftermarket, and so they are willing to pay a relatively high price in
the auction. Therefore, it is too costly for bidders B1 and B2 to outbid their competitors and
they prefer to keep the auction price low by reducing demand.
Moreover, as shown in the proof of Lemma 2, the fact that bidders do not want to deviate
from a DR equilibrium also implies that they obtain a higher proﬁt in the DR equilibrium
than in any other equilibrium with a positive auction price. Therefore, when conditions CV are
satisﬁed, equilibria with a positive auction price are Pareto dominated by the DR equilibrium
and, by Assumption 3, they are never chosen by bidders.
Now consider the seller’s revenue. Allowing resale increases the maximum price that low-
value bidders are willing to pay in the auction and, by attracting speculators, increases the
number of competitors. These eﬀects tend to increase the seller’s revenue. However, allowing
35For example, bidder B1 prefers not to deviate from the DR equilibrium by outbidding bidder B2 (and all
lower-value bidders) and winning all units if and only if (k − n +1 )v1 >k (v1 − v2) ⇔ kv2 > (n − 1)v1;a n d
bidder B2 prefers not to deviate from the DR equilibrium by outbidding bidder B3 (and all lower-value bidders)
and winning (n − 1) units if and only if v2 > (n − 1)(v2 − v3) ⇔ (n − 1)v3 > (n − 2)v2.
36If the ﬁrst inequality holds, the ﬁrst (n − 1) conditions CV are satisﬁed; if the second inequality holds, the
last (n − 2) conditions CV are satisﬁed.
16resale also has contrasting eﬀects on bidders’ incentive to reduce demand. On the one hand,
compared to a DR equilibrium without resale and speculators, in a DR equilibrium with spec-
ulators bidders can win less units in the auction (because speculators have to win too). This
makes demand reduction less attractive for some bidders. But, on the other hand, when resale
is allowed demand reduction is more attractive for bidder B1, because she can buy in the resale
market the units she does not win in the auction; and deviating from demand reduction may
also be less attractive for all other bidders, because they have to pay a higher auction price to
outbid their competitors (whose bids for the ﬁrst unit are higher due to the option to resell).
So allowing resale may facilitate demand reduction and reduce the seller’s revenue.
Speciﬁcally, allowing resale and attracting speculators reduce the seller’s revenue if this
induces players to choose a DR equilibrium (when there is no DR equilibrium without resale).
By contrast, the presence of speculators increases the seller’s revenue if it eliminates a DR
equilibrium or if it induces bidders to bid more aggressively in a PP equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Allowing resale and hence attracting speculators to the auction: (i) reduces the
seller’s revenue if conditions DTV are satisﬁed and one or more of conditions CV is not satisﬁed;
(ii) increases the seller’s revenue if conditions CV are satisﬁed and one or more of conditions
DTV is not satisﬁed; (iii) increases the seller’s revenue only if one or more of conditions DTV
is not satisﬁed.
Proposition 2 shows that the eﬀect of resale and speculators on the seller’s revenue depends
on bidders’ relative valuations. If bidders are (very) asymmetric – i.e., if bidders’ use values
are suﬃciently dispersed – conditions DTV are satisﬁed and conditions CV are not satisﬁed.
Therefore, when resale is allowed all bidders bid for less units than they actually want, in order
to maintain the auction price low, even if their strategy accommodates speculators. This induces
a DR equilibrium and reduces the seller’s revenue. In this case, the demand reduction eﬀect
prevails when resale is allowed.
On the other hand, if bidders are (more) symmetric – i.e., if the use values of the two
highest-value bidders are suﬃciently similar – one or more of conditions DTV is not satisﬁed
and, when resale is allowed, some bidders bid more aggressively than when resale is not allowed
in order to outbid speculators. When conditions CV are satisﬁed – i.e., when bidders’ use
values are suﬃciently clustered – this eliminates a DR equilibrium (compared to an auction
without resale and speculators) and increases the seller’s revenue. In this case, the competition
eﬀect prevails when resale is allowed.37
37There are two other possible cases. Firstly, when both conditions DTV and conditions CV are satisﬁed,
allowing resale and attracting speculators does not aﬀect the seller’s revenue, because the auction has a DR
equilibrium both with and without resale. Secondly, when one or more of conditions DTV is not satisﬁed and
17Moreover, by Proposition 2, speculators can increase the seller’s revenue only if the auction
has no (zero-price) DR equilibrium when resale is allowed, and hence speculators are eventually
outbid by bidders with positive use values.
Corollary 1. Allowing resale and attracting speculators can increase the seller’s revenue only
if speculators do not win any unit in the auction.
So the presence of speculators in the auction is not per se good news for the seller, because
speculators may be accommodated by bidders in order to keep the auction price low. It is
the fact that speculators participate in the auction but eventually lose that indicates an actual
increase in competition, and therefore a higher seller’s revenue.38
5.2. Should Speculators Be Allowed to Participate?
Assume now that resale is allowed but that the seller prevents speculators from participating in
the auction. In this case, the highest price a bidder is happy to pay in the auction is equal to
the price at which she can trade in the resale market.
Consider a possible DR equilibrium in which bidder B1 bids the highest price she is happy
to pay for (k − n +1 )units and zero for all other units – i.e.:
b1 =( 1
2 (v1 + v2);...; 1
2 (v1 + v2)
| {z }
k−n+1
;0 ; ...;0 | {z }
n−1
),
and each other bidder bids the highest price she is happy to pay for 1 unit and zero for all other
units – i.e.:
bi =( 1
2 (v1 + vi); 0;...;0 | {z }
k−1
),i =2 ,...,n.
In this equilibrium, bidder B1 wins (k − n +1 )units, all other bidders win one unit each, and the
seller’s revenue is zero. All bidders apart from B1 resell the units they win in the aftermarket.
There are many other possible DR equilibria in which each bidder wins at least one unit and
the auction price is zero. We focus on the equilibrium in which bidder B1 wins (k − n +1 )units
because the conditions that have to be satisﬁed in order for this to be an equilibrium can be
one or more of conditions CV is not satisﬁed either (i.e., when there is no DR equilibrium regardless of whether
resale is allowed or not), the eﬀect of allowing resale on the seller’s revenue depends on whether resale induces
more bidders to reduce demand or to compete more aggressively in a PP equilibrium.
38In our model, speculators never win the auction at a positive price. Of course, in the real world speculators
may win the auction at a positive price in the presence of uncertainty because, for example, in a simultaneous
ascending auction bidders may reduce demand only after raising the auction price some distance to test the
credibility of speculators, or since they do not know at the beginning of the auction that their opponents are only
trying to win to resell. In this case, the seller’s revenue in principle may be higher if resale is allowed even when
bidders allow speculators to win. But our point is that, in general, observing bidders accommodate speculators
rather than compete aggressively to outbid them should not be considered good news for the seller.
18readily compared to conditions DTV and, therefore, this DR equilibrium is directly comparable
to the DR equilibrium when speculators participate in the auction.
Moreover, the conditions that have to be satisﬁed for the DR equilibrium described are
suﬃcient but not necessary for a DR equilibrium, because these conditions are more restrictive
than the conditions that have to be satisﬁed for any other DR equilibrium. The reason is that,
in the equilibrium described, bidder B1 wins the highest number of units consistent with each
bidder winning at least one unit. But, when resale is allowed, bidder B1 has no incentive to
deviate from demand reduction, and other bidders would have a weaker incentive to deviate
from a DR equilibrium in which they win more units.
We investigate when the seller can obtain no revenue from the auction. Deﬁne the following
(n − 2) conditions “Dispersed Top Values or Clustered Bottom Values” (DCV):
v1 +( n +2− i)vi > (n +1− i)v2,i =3 ,...,n. (DCV)
Lemma 3. When resale is allowed but speculators are not allowed to participate, the auction
has a (zero-price) DR equilibrium if conditions DCV are satisﬁed. Moreover, if conditions DCV
are satisﬁed, the (zero-price) DR equilibrium Pareto dominates, from the bidders’ point of view,
any other equilibrium with a positive auction price.
As shown in the proof of Lemma 3, if conditions DCV are satisﬁed, no players wants to
deviate from the DR equilibrium described. Exactly as with speculators, bidder B1 has no
incentive to deviate from demand reduction, because trying to win more units in the auction
would only increase the auction price she has to pay. Bidder B2 is the one who has the strongest
incentive to deviate from demand reduction, because she gains the most from outbidding her
competitors and reselling in the aftermarket. So if bidder B2 does not deviate from the DR
equilibrium, the other lower-value bidders do not deviate either.
Conditions DCV require that bidder B1’s use value is suﬃciently higher than bidder B2’s
use value or, alternatively, that the use values of lower-value bidders are suﬃciently high. For
example, conditions DCV are satisﬁed if v1+2vn > (n − 2)v2. The intuition is that, when bidder
B2’s use value is closer to lower-value bidders’ use values than to bidder B1’s use value, it is too
costly for bidder B2 to outbid lower-value bidders (whose bids for the ﬁrst unit are increasing in
bidder B1’s use value and their own use values). So bidder B2 prefers to keep the auction price
low by reducing demand, rather than win more units by outbidding her competitors. Moreover,
by Assumption 3, if conditions DCV are satisﬁed players do not play an equilibrium with a
positive auction price, because such an equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the DR equilibrium.
Now consider the seller’s revenue. If there is no DR equilibrium when speculators participate
in the auction, the presence of speculators only increases the number of competitors; hence it
19cannot reduce the seller’s revenue. So speculators can reduce the seller’s revenue if and only
if they induce bidders to choose a DR equilibrium – i.e., if and only if demand reduction is
not an equilibrium without speculators, but it is an equilibrium if speculators participate in the
auction. But, as the next proposition shows, this never happens.
Proposition 3. If the seller cannot prevent resale, the presence of speculators in the auction
(weakly) increases the seller’s revenue.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, when resale is allowed there is a DR equilibrium when
speculators participate in the auction only if there is a DR equilibrium also when speculators
do not participate in the auction.39 Therefore, the presence of speculators never reduces the
seller’s revenue. And if conditions DCV are satisﬁed but one or more of conditions DTV is not
satisﬁed, the presence of speculators strictly increases the seller’s revenue because it eliminates
a DR equilibrium.
The intuition for this result is that, if resale is possible, bidders have a stronger incentive to
reduce demand when speculators do not participate in the auction. Firstly, because any player
who wins a unit in the auction wants to resell it to bidder B1, bidder B1 has an incentive to reduce
demand even when speculators do not participate. Secondly, lower-value bidders have a stronger
incentive to reduce demand when speculators do not participate, because in a DR equilibrium
without speculators they can win more units than in a DR equilibrium with speculators. And
even if they win the same number of units, they pay a (weakly) higher price when speculators
participate. Hence, by contrast to the case in which the seller can prevent resale, if resale is
always possible demand reduction cannot possibly be easier when speculators participate in the
auction. And so the only eﬀect of the presence of speculators is to increase competition in the
auction.
5.3. Seller’s Strategy
Summing up the results of the last two sections, if the seller cannot prevent resale, he should
always welcome speculators in the auction. But if the seller can credibly forbid resale and knows
bidders’ relative valuations, he should forbid resale if bidders are asymmetric (i.e., if their use
values are dispersed), while he should allow resale and attract speculators to the auction if
39We show this by proving that conditions DTV (the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a DR equilibrium
when speculators participate in the auction) imply conditions DCV (the suﬃcient conditions for a DR equilibrium
when resale is allowed but speculators do not participate in the auction). Therefore, if resale is allowed, whenever
demand reduction is an equilibrium with speculators, it is also an equilibrium without speculators.
20bidders are symmetric (i.e., if their use values are clustered).40,41
Therefore, knowing bidders’ relative valuations and being able to prevent resale can help the
seller to increase his revenue. By contrast, being able to distinguish speculators from bidders is
not useful for the seller, because excluding speculators from the auction can increase the seller’s
revenue only if it is achieved by forbidding resale. And if the seller wants to induce enough
speculators to participate, he can simply allow resale and not restrict entry in the auction.
When resale is allowed, the ﬁnal allocation of the units is always eﬃcient, even if bidders
reduce demand during the auction (and so the allocation at the end of the auction is not eﬃcient).
But if the seller prevents resale to increase his revenue, the highest-value bidder may still prefer
to reduce demand and let other bidders win, in which case the ﬁnal allocation of the units is
ineﬃcient.42 So the seller may face a trade-oﬀ between increasing his revenue and maximizing
eﬃciency.
The seller may also want to impose a higher reserve price in order to make demand reduction
less attractive for bidders and increase his revenue. While it is typically argued that a reserve
price reduces eﬃciency because it may lead to no sale, in our model a higher reserve price can
increase the eﬃciency of the initial allocation achieved by the auction, because it can eliminate
a DR equilibrium and crowd out speculators if resale is allowed. Moreover, if resale is not
allowed, a reserve price that eliminates a DR equilibrium also increases the eﬃciency of the ﬁnal
allocation of the units on sale.
6. Resale without Speculators
What is the eﬀect on the seller’s revenue of allowing resale, when the number of competitors in
the auction is ﬁxed and there is no speculator who is willing to participate in the auction? To
answer this question, we compare an auction with only n bidders and no speculator in which
resale is not allowed, to an auction with the same number of bidders and no speculator in which
resale is allowed.43 (So we basically compare the second and third scenarios of Section 5.)
To simplify the analysis, in this section we assume n = k, but our qualitative results also
hold for n 6= k.D e ﬁne the following (n − 1) conditions “Clustered Values 1” (CV1), which are
40The seller may know that there are diﬀerent “types” of bidders in the auction, and he may have a good
estimate of how heterogeneous their valuations are. For example, in mobile-phone license auctions incumbents
typically have substantially higher use values than new entrants, and the seller often knows how far apart their
values are, even though he does not know the exact amount of any of their values.
41Of course, the uniform-price auction that we consider is not an optimal selling mechanism, neither with resale
nor without resale.
42However, if resale is allowed and speculators win some of the units on sale, this may reduce eﬃciency (compared
to an auction in which the units are directly assigned to bidder with the highest use value), because it can delay
the productive use of the units by the bidder with the highest use value.
43Pagnozzi (2006) analyzes the combined eﬀect that bundling the units on sale and allowing resale have on the
seller’s revenue in multi-unit auctions without speculators.
21equivalent to conditions CV when n = k:
(n +2− i)vi > (n +1− i)v1,i =2 ,...,n. (CV1)
Lemma 4. Assume there is no speculator. If resale is not allowed, the auction has a (zero-price)
DR equilibrium if and only if conditions CV1 are satisﬁed. If resale is allowed, the auction has a
(zero-price) DR equilibrium if and only if conditions DCV are satisﬁe d .I nb o t hc a s e s ,w h e nt h e
auction has a (zero-price) DR equilibrium, this is also the unique Pareto dominant equilibrium
for bidders.
The eﬀect on the seller’s revenue of allowing resale depends on whether it induces bidders to
reduce demand to one unit each (compared to an auction without resale) or it induces bidders
to bid more aggressively when they do not reduce demand to one unit.
Proposition 4. When there is no speculator who may participate in the auction, allowing re-
sale: (i) reduces the seller’s revenue if conditions DCV are satisﬁed and one or more of conditions
CV1 is not satisﬁed; (ii) increases the seller’s revenue if all conditions DCV are not satisﬁed.
Notice that, without resale, there is no DR equilibrium if bidders are asymmetric – i.e., if
bidder B1’s use value is much higher than the other bidders’ use values – because in this case
bidder B1 prefers to win more units in the auction, even at the cost of paying a higher price
(which depends on her competitors’ use values). But allowing resale makes bidders’ willingness
to pay in the auction closer to each other, because bidder B1 is willing to pay a price lower than
her use value due to the option to buy in the resale market, while all other bidders are willing
to pay a price higher than their use values due to the option to sell in the resale market. This
makes demand reduction more attractive for bidders.44
Speciﬁcally, allowing resale makes it more likely that the auction has a DR equilibrium,
because: (1) r e s a l em a k e si tm o r ep r o ﬁtable for bidder B1 to reduce demand (since she can
buy in the resale market the units she loses in the auction when she reduces demand), (2) resale
m a k e si tl e s sp r o ﬁtable for all other bidders to deviate from a DR equilibrium by outbidding their
competitors (whose bids for the ﬁrst unit are higher due to the option to resell),45 and (3) when
there is no speculator, resale has no countervailing eﬀect on the number of competitors in the
44In the proof of Proposition 4, we show that conditions CV1 imply conditions DCV, but the converse is not
true. Therefore, whenever demand reduction is an equilibrium without resale, it is also an equilibrium with resale.
45Consider, for example, bidder Bn−1. Without resale, she does not deviate from a DR equilibrium if and only if
outbidding bidder Bn is not proﬁtable – i.e., if and only if vn−1 > 2(vn−1 − vn). By contrast, with resale bidder
Bn−1 does not deviate from a DR equilibrium if and only if
1
2 (v1 + vn−1) > 2
1
2 (v1 + vn−1) −
1
2 (v1 + vn)

,a
condition that is always satisﬁed. (Moreover, with resale, no bidder ever wants to deviate from a DR equilibrium
by outbidding the lowest-value bidder.)
22auction (which could otherwise make demand reduction less proﬁtable for bidders).46 Therefore,
when conditions DCV are satisﬁed but one or more of conditions CV1 is not satisﬁed, bidders
choose a DR equilibrium only when resale is allowed. In this case allowing resale reduces the
seller’s revenue.
However, allowing resale also increases the highest prices that all bidders, apart from B1,a r e
willing to pay for the ﬁrst unit in the auction. When bidders never choose a DR equilibrium –
i.e., when there are only PP equilibria both when resale is allowed and when resale is not allowed
– resale induces all bidders, apart from B1, to bid more aggressively for at least one unit and
may increase the seller’s revenue (even though resale still makes it relatively more proﬁtable for
bidders to reduce demand). For example, allowing resale increases the seller’s revenue when all
conditions DCV are not satisﬁed, because then bidder B2 has a much higher use value than
lower-value bidders and prefers to outbid all her competitors rather than reduce demand to one
unit, even if resale is allowed. And, as shown in the proof of Proposition 4, in this case the
equilibrium auction price is always higher with resale.
Allowing resale ensures an eﬃcient ﬁnal allocation of the units on sale. By contrast, if resale is
not allowed and bidders reduce demand, the ﬁnal allocation of the units is ineﬃcient. Therefore,
as when there are speculators who may participate in the auction, in choosing whether to allow
resale the seller may face a trade-oﬀ between increasing his revenue and maximizing eﬃciency.
7. Conclusions
Although speculators are attracted by the possibility of resale, in single-object auctions it is
unclear why high-value bidders should let speculators win and then buy in the resale market,
rather than simply outbid speculators during the auction.
We have made three main points. Firstly, we have shown that, in multi-object auctions,
high-value bidders may strictly prefer to let speculators win, in order to keep the price low and
acquire some of the objects on sale more cheaply in the auction. Arguably, this is what happened
in the UK 3.4GHz license auction.
Secondly, it is not true that the only eﬀect of allowing resale to attract speculators is to
increase competition in the auction, and therefore that resale and speculators always increase
the seller’s revenue. We have shown that allowing resale, even though it attracts speculators,
may induce an accommodating strategy by high-value bidders, and hence it may reduce the
seller’s revenue. In fact, when high-value bidders allow speculators to win the auction, they
do so to avoid raising the auction price. So resale and speculators increase the seller’s revenue
46The ﬁrst two eﬀects of resale are present both with and without speculators and always facilitate demand
reduction; while the third eﬀect of resale on the number of competitors in the auction is only present when there
are speculators willing to participate in the auction.
23only if their eﬀect on competition is stronger than their eﬀect on bidders’ incentives to reduce
demand.
Thirdly, when it does not attract speculators, it is even more likely that resale reduces the
seller’s revenue, because allowing resale increases the incentive for all bidders to reduce demand,
and without speculators it has no countervailing eﬀect on the number of competitors in the
auction.
It is often argued that resale after an auction should never be forbidden because, by allowing
bidders to exploit gains from trade in the aftermarket, resale ensures an eﬃcient ﬁnal allocation
of the units on sale.47 While our analysis does not dispute this claim, it shows that the possibility
of resale, through its eﬀect on bidding strategies during the auction, may yield a lower revenue
for the seller, even when there are speculators who will participate in the auction when resale
is allowed. Therefore, in a multi-object auction resale may be forbidden by a seller who favors
revenue over eﬃciency.
47For example, the 2002 “Cave Report,” which was commissioned by the UK Government to review its spectrum
policies, recommends allowing trading of the spectrum licenses auctioned by the Government to increase eﬃciency.
And since 2003, the US Federal Communications Commission allows leasing and trading of the spectrum licenses
it sells by auctions.
24A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We let π∗
i denote the proﬁtt h a tp l a y e ri obtains in equilibrium. In a DR
equilibrium, each player wins one unit in the auction at price zero. Therefore, each speculator




bidder Bi obtains a proﬁt equal to the price at which she resells in the aftermarket – i.e.:
π∗
i = 1
2 (v1 + vi),i =2 ,...,n,
and bidder B1 obtains a proﬁte q u a lt ot h ed i ﬀerence between her valuation for the k units, and
the price she has to pay to acquire (k − 1) units in the aftermarket ((n − 1) units from other
bidders and (k − n) units from speculators) – i.e.:
π∗




(v1 + vi) − (k − n) 1
2v1






First notice that no player has an incentive to deviate from a (zero-price) DR equilibrium
by winning less units, because this does not aﬀect the auction price, and hence can only reduce
the player’s proﬁt. And speculators have no incentive to deviate from a DR equilibrium at all
because, in order to win more than one unit, a speculator has to raise the auction price at least
up to 1
2v1, in which case he obtains no proﬁt.
Similarly, bidder B1 has no incentive to deviate from a DR equilibrium because, after re-
ducing demand, bidder B1 still buys in the resale market all the units she does not win in the
auction, at the same price she would have to pay to win them in the auction. So the only eﬀect
of winning more than one unit in the auction is to increase the auction price that bidder B1
pays for the ﬁrst unit she wins.
By contrast, other bidders may want to deviate from a DR equilibrium and outbid lower-value
bidders and/or speculators. (It is clearly never proﬁtable for a bidder to outbid the ﬁrst-unit
bid of a competitor with a higher value.) Consider bidder B2. Clearly, if bidder B2 overbids
speculators, she overbids all of them. Bidder B2 can outbid all speculators by bidding 1
2v1 for
(k − n +1 )units.48 In this case, she wins (k − n +1 )units in the auction that she can resell at
price 1
2 (v1 + v2) to bidder B1 in the aftermarket. This deviation is not proﬁtable if and only if:
π∗
2 = 1
2 (v1 + v2) > (k − n +1 )
£1
2 (v1 + v2) − 1
2v1
¤
⇔ v1 > (k − n)v2. (A.1)
Bidder B2 may also want to outbid lower-value bidders. Indeed, by bidding 1
2 (v1 + vj) for
(k − j +2 )units and a lower price for all other units, she overbids bidders Bj,..., Bn (in addition
to all speculators)49 and wins (k − j +2 )units in the auction that she can resell to bidder B1
in the aftermarket. This deviation is not proﬁtable if and only if, for j =3 ,...,n:
π∗
2 = 1
2 (v1 + v2) > (k − j +2 )
£1
2 (v1 + v2) − 1
2 (v1 + vj)
¤
48By Assumption 4, in order to beat a speculator, bidder B2 only needs to bid exactly the same price that the
speculator bids.
49By Assumption 4, in order to beat a lower-value bidder, bidder B2 only needs to bid exactly the same price
that the lower-value bidder bids.
25⇔ (k − j +2 )vj + v1 > (k − j +1 )v2. (A.2)
Summing up conditions A.1 and A.2, bidder B2 does not want to deviate from a DR equilibrium
i fa n do n l yi ft h ef o l l o w i n g(n − 1) conditions are satisﬁed:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
v1 +( k − 1)v3 > (k − 2)v2,
v1 +( k − 2)v4 > (k − 3)v2,
. . .
v1 +( k − n +3 )vn−1 > (k − n +2 )v2,
v1 +( k − n +2 )vn > (k − n +1 )v2,
v1 > (k − n)v2.
(DTV)
If bidder B2 does not want to deviate from a DR equilibrium, then no other lower-value
bidder wants to deviate either. To see this, consider bidder Bi, i 6=1 ,2. Bidder Bi prefers
to reduce demand and win one unit at price 0 rather than outbid bidder Bj, j>i ,a n dw i n
(k − j +1 )units if and only if:
π∗
i = 1
2 (v1 + vi) > (k − j +1 )
£1
2 (v1 + vi) − 1
2 (v1 + vj)
¤
⇔ (k − j +1 )vj + v1 > (k − j)vi.
Clearly, this condition is implied by A.2, the condition for bidder B2 not wanting to outbid
bidder Bj. Similarly, the condition for bidder Bi not wanting to deviate from a DR equilibrium
by outbidding speculators is implied by condition A.1.
In conclusion, if and only if conditions DTV are satisﬁed, all players prefer to reduce demand
and win one unit at price zero when their opponents are reducing demand to one unit, rather
then deviate and win more units. Hence, there is a zero-price DR equilibrium.
When conditions DTV are satisﬁed, there may be other equilibria with demand reduction
in which each player wins one unit but the auction price is strictly positive.50 However, these
equilibria are Pareto dominated for all players by the zero-price DR equilibrium, because the
ﬁnal allocation is the same in all these equilibria and only the auction price that players pay
is diﬀerent. Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that equilibria with demand reduction
and a strictly positive auction price require conditions that are more restrictive then conditions
DTV. Therefore, whenever the auction has an equilibrium with demand reduction and a strictly
positive price, it also has a zero-price DR equilibrium.
When conditions DTV are satisﬁed, there may also be PP equilibria. (An analysis of the
various types of PP equilibria is contained in the working paper version of this article.) However,
these equilibria are Pareto dominated for all players by the zero-price DR equilibrium. To see
this, notice that in a PP equilibrium the auction price is at least 1
2v1 if only speculators lose, and
is at least 1
2 (v1 + vi) if bidder Bi loses. But, when conditions DTV are satisﬁed, each bidder
prefers to win one unit at price zero, rather than win more units by outbidding speculators
and paying a price equal to 1
2v1 or by outbidding a lower-value bidder and paying a price
equal to her willingness to pay. Therefore, each bidder obtains a strictly higher proﬁti naD R
equilibrium than in a PP equilibrium. And, clearly, also speculators are strictly better oﬀ in a
DR equilibrium.
50For example, it may be an equilibrium for each player to bid the highest price he is happy to pay for one unit,
and price p such that 0 <p<
1
2v1 for all other units. In this case, each player wins one unit and the auction
price is p.
26When one or more of conditions DTV is not satisﬁed, at least one bidder wants to outbid
a l ls p e c u l a t o r s ,e v e ni fa l lo t h e rp l a y e r sr e d u c ed emand. So speculators cannot win the auction.
And in order to outbid speculators, this bidder has to raise the auction price at least up to
1
2v1 (because each speculator bids 1
2v1 for the ﬁrst unit). So the only possible equilibria of the
auction are PP equilibria. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .The “if” part of the statement follows from Lemma 1. The “only
if” part follows because, in order for all speculators to win in equilibrium, each bidder must
prefer to reduce demand and bid less than 1
2v1 for all units apart from the ﬁrst one, rather than
overbid speculators in order to win more units. And, as shown in the proof of Lemma 1, if this
is the case then the auction also has a (zero-price) DR equilibrium. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .In the DR equilibrium that we have deﬁned, bidder B1 wins (k − n +1 )
units at price zero and obtains a proﬁte q u a lt o :
π∗
1 =( k − n +1 )v1,
while each other bidder wins one unit at price zero and obtains a proﬁt equal to her valuation
–i . e . :
π∗
i = vi,i =2 ,...,n.
Bidders may prefer to deviate, outbid their competitors, and win more units. Consider
bidder B1 ﬁrst. Bidder B1 prefers to win (k − n +1 )units at price 0, rather than outbid bidder
Bj, j =2 ,...,nand win (k − j +2 )units by bidding vj for (k − j +2 )units, if and only if:
π∗
1 =( k − n +1 )v1 > (k − j +2 )( v1 − vj) ⇔ (k − j +2 )vj > (n − j +1 )v1. (A.3)
Now consider bidder B2.I t i s n e v e r p r o ﬁtable for bidder B2 to outbid bidder B1.M o r e o v e r ,
bidder B2 prefers to win one unit at price 0 rather than outbid bidder Bj, j =3 ,...,n,a n dw i n
(n − j +2 )units if and only if:
π∗
2 = v2 > (n − j +2 )( v2 − vj) ⇔ (n − j +2 )vj > (n − j +1 )v2. (A.4)
Summing up conditions A.3 and A.4, bidders B1 and B2 do not want to deviate from the
DR equilibrium if and only if the following (2n − 3) conditions are satisﬁed:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
kv2 > (n − 1)v1,
(k − 1)v3 > (n − 2)v1,
. . .
(k − n +2 )vn >v 1,
(n − 1)v3 > (n − 2)v2,




It is straightforward to check that if bidder B2 does not want to deviate from the DR
equilibrium, then no other lower-value bidder wants to deviate either. Therefore, if and only
if conditions CV are satisﬁed, all bidders prefer to reduce demand to one unit and bid zero
27for all other units when their opponents are reducing demand to one unit, rather then deviate
and outbid any other bidder to win more units. And so, in this case, there is a zero-price DR
equilibrium.
There are other possible strategies that involve demand reduction and in which bidders divide
the units among themselves diﬀerently. But the conditions that have to be satisﬁed for these
strategies to be an equilibrium are more restrictive than conditions CV. This is because bidder
B1 is the bidder with the strongest incentive to deviate from demand reduction (because she
has the highest use value, and hence she gains the most from winning a unit in the auction).
Therefore, the DR equilibrium in which bidder B1 wins (k − n +1 )units is the equilibrium with
demand reduction that minimizes her incentive to deviate.51
Of course, the auction may also have PP equilibria in which some bidders do not win any unit
and the auction price is positive. However, when conditions CV are satisﬁed, the DR equilibrium
that we have deﬁned Pareto dominates, from the bidders’ point of view, all equilibria with a
positive auction price. To see this, notice that in a PP equilibrium the auction price is at least
equal to the valuation of the highest-value bidder who loses the auction. But, when conditions
CV are satisﬁed, each bidder Bj, j =2 ,...,n, prefers to win one unit at price zero, rather than
win more units by outbidding a lower-value bidder and paying a price equal to her valuation,
and bidder B1 prefers to win (k − n +1 ) units at price zero, rather than win more units by
outbidding a lower-value bidder and paying a price equal to her valuation. Therefore, each
bidder obtains a strictly higher proﬁt in the DR equilibrium deﬁned than in any equilibrium
with a positive auction price.
When one or more of conditions CV is not satisﬁed, at least bidder B2 wants to outbid
a lower-value bidder and raise the auction price, even if all other bidders reduce demand. So
there are only PP equilibria in which some bidders do not win any unit and the auction price is
positive. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .First notice that conditions DTV and conditions CV are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive – i.e., the two sets of conditions are not disjoint and may be satisﬁed
together.52 Moreover, none of the two sets of conditions implies the other; and conditions in
both sets may simultaneously not be satisﬁed. Whether resale reduces or increases the seller’s
revenue depends on whether demand reduction is an equilibrium when resale is allowed.
If conditions DTV are satisﬁed and one or more of conditions CV is not satisﬁed, there is
a zero-price DR equilibrium if and only if resale is allowed. Therefore, allowing resale induces
bidders to choose a DR equilibrium and strictly reduces the seller’s revenue. This proves part
(i) of the statement.
If one or more of conditions DTV is not satisﬁed and conditions CV are satisﬁed, there is a
zero-price DR equilibrium if and only if resale is not allowed. Therefore, allowing resale induces
51This is true also for a (zero-price) DR equilibrium in which bidders equally share the units on sale. Assume,
for example, that k =2 n and consider a possible DR equilibrium in which each bidder wins 2 units and the
auction price is zero. In order for this to be an equilibrium, it is necessary and suﬃcient that bidder B1 does not
want to deviate. Bidder B1 prefers to win 2 units at price 0 rather than overbid bidder Bj and win (2n − 2j +4 )
units at price vj if and only if:
2v1 > (2n − 2j +4 )( v1 − vj) ⇔ (n − j +2 )vj > (n − j +1 )v1,j =2 ,...,n,.
The above conditions imply conditions CV; hence they are more restrictive.
52For example, conditions DTV and conditions CV are all satisﬁed if v1 > (k − 2)v2, kvn > (n − 1)v1,a n d
(n − 1)vn > (n − 2)v2 (which is true, for example, if n =2and v1 > (k − 2)v2 > (n − 1)v1 − 2v2).
28bidders to choose an equilibrium with a positive auction price and increases the seller’s revenue.
This proves part (ii) of the statement.
If both conditions DTV and conditions CV are satisﬁed, there is a zero-price DR equilibrium
both with and without resale. Therefore, allowing resale has no eﬀect on the seller’s revenue.
Finally, if one or more of conditions DTV is not satisﬁed and one or more of conditions CV
is not satisﬁed either, there are only PP equilibria both when resale is allowed and when resale
is not allowed. In this case, allowing resale induces all bidders apart from bidder B1 to bid
more aggressively for the ﬁrst unit than when resale is not allowed, because of the possibility of
reselling to bidder B1, and induces some bidders (but not bidder B1) to also bid aggressively for
more than one unit, in order to outbid speculators and other lower-value bidders. This tends
to increase the seller’s revenue. However, allowing resale also aﬀects bidders incentive to reduce
demand, and there may be a PP equilibrium in which bidders reduce demand, even if they
outbid all speculators. This may reduce the seller’s revenue. So a PP equilibrium when resale
is allowed may have both a higher price and a lower price then a PP equilibrium when resale is
not allowed. Therefore, in this case, the eﬀe c to fa l l o w i n gr e s a l eo nt h es e l l e r ’ sr e v e n u ei sm o r e
ambiguous and depends on whether resale induces more higher-value bidders to reduce demand
or to bid more aggressively to beat their competitors, compared to an auction without resale.
Nonetheless, in order for resale to strictly increase the seller’s revenue, it is necessary that
the auction has no (zero-price) DR equilibrium when resale is allowed; hence that one or more
of conditions DTV is not satisﬁed. (Otherwise, the seller’s revenue is equal to zero when resale
is allowed.) This proves part (iii) of the statement. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .In the DR equilibrium that we have deﬁned, bidder B1 wins (k − n +1 )
units in the auction at price zero. All other bidders win one unit each and resell to bidder B1
in the aftermarket. Therefore, each bidder diﬀerent from B1 obtains a proﬁt equal to the price
at which she resells to bidder B1 in the aftermarket – i.e.:
π∗
i = 1
2 (v1 + vi),i =2 ,...,n,
and bidder B1 obtains a proﬁte q u a lt ot h ed i ﬀerence between her valuation for the k units, and
the price she has to pay to acquire (n − 1) units from the other bidders in the aftermarket –
i.e.:
π∗











First notice that bidder B1 has no incentive to deviate from the DR equilibrium, because
the only eﬀect of outbidding another bidder and winning more than one unit in the auction is
to increase the auction price that bidder B1 pays for the ﬁrst unit she wins.
Now consider bidder B2.I ti sn e v e rp r o ﬁtable for bidder B2 to outbid bidder B1.M o r e o v e r ,
bidder B2 prefers to win one unit at price 0 rather than outbid bidder Bj, j =3 ,...,n,a n dw i n
(n − j +2 )units if and only if:
π∗
2 = 1
2 (v1 + v2) > (n − j +2 )
£1
2 (v1 + v2) − 1
2 (v1 + vj)
¤
29⇔ (n − j +2 )vj + v1 > (n − j +1 )v2.
So bidder B2 does not deviate from the DR equilibrium if and only if the following (n − 2)
conditions are satisﬁed: ⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
v1 +( n − 1)v3 > (n − 2)v2,
v1 +( n − 2)v4 > (n − 3)v2,
. . .
v1 +2 vn >v 2.
(DCV)
And it is straightforward to check that, if bidder B2 does not want to deviate from the DR
equilibrium, no other lower-value bidder wants to deviate either. Therefore, if conditions DCV
are satisﬁed, all bidders prefer to reduce demand when their opponents reduce demand, rather
then deviate and outbid any other bidder to win more units.
By an argument analogous to the one in the proof of Lemma 2, when conditions DCV are
satisﬁed, the DR equilibrium that we have deﬁned Pareto dominates, from the bidders’ point of
view, all other equilibria with a positive auction price. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . Conditions DTV imply conditionsD C V ,b u tt h ec o n v e r s ei sn o t
true, because, since k>n :
v1 +( k − i +2 )vi > (k − i +1 )v2
⇒
:
v1 +( n − i +2 )vi > (n − i +1 )v2.
Therefore, when resale is allowed, if there is a DR equilibrium when speculators participate in
the auction, there is also a DR equilibrium when speculators do not participate in the auction.
So the presence of speculators eliminates a DR equilibrium and increases the seller’s revenue
when conditions DCV are satisﬁed and one or more of conditions DTV is not satisﬁed.
When speculators are not allowed to participate in the auction, there are other possible (zero-
price) DR equilibria in which each bidder wins one unit, but bidders share the units diﬀerently
from the equilibrium we have deﬁned. (For example, there may be an equilibrium in which
bidder B1 wins less than (k − n +1 )units and another bidder wins more than one unit.) But
t h ec o n d i t i o n st h a th a v et ob es a t i s ﬁed for these other DR equilibria are less restrictive than
conditions DCV. This is because the equilibrium we have deﬁned is the DR equilibrium in which
bidder B1 wins the highest possible number of units. But bidder B1 never wants to deviate from
a DR equilibrium anyway (regardless of the number of units he wins in the DR equilibrium),
and when another bidder wins more units, this bidder has a lower incentive to deviate from a
DR equilibrium. Therefore, considering other DR equilibria when speculators do not participate
in the auction only reinforces our conclusion that it is easier to have a DR equilibrium without
speculators than with speculators; hence that speculators cannot reduce the seller’s revenue by
inducing bidders to reduce demand.
Finally, if there is no DR equilibrium when speculators participate in the auction, the pres-
ence of speculators can never reduce the seller’s revenue because, in this case, speculators only
increase the number of competitors in the auction and can only induce bidders to bid more
aggressively and raise the auction price. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 .The ﬁrst part of the statement is a special case of Lemma 2. The second
part follows from Lemma 3. In contrast to Lemma 3, conditions DCV are also necessary for
30a DR equilibrium when resale is allowed because, if n = k, in a DR equilibrium each bidder
has to win exactly one unit. By an argument analogous to the one in the proof of Lemma
1, whenever the auction has a (zero-price) DR equilibrium, this equilibrium is also the unique
Pareto dominant equilibrium for bidders. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .Conditions CV1 are more restrictive than conditions DCV. Indeed,
conditions CV1 imply conditions DCV, but the converse is not true, because:
(n − i +2 )vi > (n − i +1 )v2
⇒
:
v1 +( n − i +2 )vi > (n − i +1 )v2.
Hence, without speculators, if there is a DR equilibrium when resale is not allowed, there is
also a DR equilibrium when resale is allowed. So the possibility of resale facilitates demand
reduction and, therefore, it may reduce the seller’s revenue. This happens when conditions
DCV are satisﬁed, so that there is a zero-price DR equilibrium with resale, and one or more
of conditions CV1 is not satisﬁed, so that there is no zero-price DR equilibrium without resale.
This proves part (i) of the statement.
On the other hand, if both conditions DCV and conditions CV1 are satisﬁed, resale does not
aﬀect the seller’s revenue, because there is a zero-price DR equilibrium both with and without
resale.
If one or more of conditions DCV is not satisﬁed, there is no DR equilibrium when resale is
allowed. And since one or more of conditions CV1 is not satisﬁed either, there is also no DR
equilibrium when resale is not allowed. So the auction price is positive both with resale and
without resale. But when resale is allowed all bidders apart from bidder B1 bid more aggressively
for the ﬁrst unit than when resale is not allowed, because of the possibility of selling to bidder
B1 in the resale market, and some bidders (but not bidder B1) bid aggressively for more than
one unit, in order to outbid their competitors. This tends to increase the seller’s revenue.
However, allowing resale still aﬀects bidders incentive to reduce demand “among themselves,”
because there may be a PP equilibrium in which bidders reduce demand, even if they outbid all
speculators. Therefore, if one or more of conditions DCV is not satisﬁed, the eﬀect of allowing
resale on the auction price is more ambiguous.
But suppose that all conditions DCV are not satisﬁed. Then, when resale is allowed, bidder
B2 outbids all lower-value bidders, while bidder B1 does not outbid bidder B2 because she always
prefers to reduce demand. Therefore, when resale is allowed, there is only one PP equilibrium
with an auction price p∗ = 1
2 (v1 + v3).
By contrast, when resale is not allowed, there can be a PP equilibrium with an auction price
at most equal to v2, which is bidder B2’s bid for the ﬁrst unit. If without resale the auction
price is lower than v2, then clearly allowing resale increases the seller’s revenue. So suppose that,
without resale, there is a PP equilibrium in which bidder B1 wins all units and the auction price
is equal to v2, which may be higher than p∗. (This is the only case in which the price is equal
to v2 in equilibrium.) Then it is at least necessary that bidder B1 prefers to outbid all other
bidders and win n units at price v2, rather than win (n − 1) units only at price v3.O t h e r w i s e ,
by Assumption 3, an equilibrium in which bidder B1 wins all units and the auction price is v2
would not be played because it would be Pareto dominated by an equilibrium in which bidder
B1 reduces demand and wins (n − 1) units, bidder B2 wins 1 unit, and the auction price is
v3. Therefore, in order for the auction price to be equal to v2 when resale is not allowed it is
31necessary that:
n(v1 − v2) > (n − 1)(v1 − v3) ⇔ v1 +( n − 1)v3 >n v 2. (A.5)
And rearranging inequality A.5, we have that:
v1 + v3 − (n − 2)(v2 − v3) > 2v2
⇒ v1 + v3 > 2v2 ⇔ p∗ >v 2.
Hence, if all conditions DCV are not satisﬁe d ,w h e nr e s a l ei sn o ta l l o w e di ne q u i l i b r i u mt h e
auction price is lower than p∗, which is the auction price when resale is allowed. This proves
part (ii) of the statement. ¥
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